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INTRODUCTION: GINGER SNAPS 
The original idea for this paper occurred because I watched a film titled Ginger Snaps 
(John Fawcett, 2000). I related to it (or rather, to the figure of the werewolf within it) to an 
almost uncomfortable degree. This was not something I had expected at the outset. Ginger Snaps 
is a modestly budgeted Canadian horror film about a teenage girl who is bitten by, and 
subsequently transforms into, a werewolf—nothing about it pre-viewing struck me as potentially 
profound or paper-inspiring. And, to be fair, it was not the narrative of the movie that struck me 
or even any specific technical element of the film. Instead, it was one minor, seemingly 
insignificant scene. The scene in question finds the protagonist of the film, Ginger, discovering 
that she has begun growing a tail. Embarrassed by this new bodily development, Ginger tucks 
and tapes her tail between her legs before getting dressed and going to school. I assume that, for 
many people, this extremely brief scene whizzes by without much thought—a mere vignette in 
the life of a Canadian teenager becoming a werewolf—but this scene did something else for me: 
it found a way to depict something that I experience daily and yet never see depicted onscreen—
to be explicit: tucking, the practice of hiding of one’s penis and testicles so that they are not 
visible through tight clothing. After this scene, not only did the whole of Ginger Snaps read 
differently to me; I had uncovered a very personal, uncomfortable subtext within a meager horror 
film. 
 Of course, after watching the film, I did some digging to see if anyone else had noticed 
what I had noticed and what they had made of it. Yet, when I researched Ginger Snaps, I did not 
find much. The 2011 article “Out by Sixteen: Queer(ed) Girls in Ginger Snaps” by Tanis 
MacDonald was the closest to tapping into what I had felt, yet its analysis of the “queer(ed) 
girls” in the film completely leaves out any possible suggestion of subtextual transgenderism 
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within the film, instead MacDonald focuses solely on the film’s possible incestuous lesbian 
implications. MacDonald writes that Ginger Snaps equates “transformation not only with sexual 
awakening but also with a sharpening of erotic intimacy between queer(ed) girls.”1 Thus, her 
reading of the film finds it to be a metaphor for incestuous, lesbian awakenings within Ginger. 
While I do not think MacDonald’s reading is incorrect, but I do think it is lacking something—a 
certain something that has been frequently alluded to by those theorists writing about horror, but 
a something which has not received the consideration it deserves. In this paper I will explore that 
something which has seemingly, strangely been absent from scholarship on the horror genre. 
That “something” is the genre’s close, complicated, and longstanding relationship with the ever-
evolving concepts of transness and transgenderism. 
 Adam Lowenstein writes in his book Shocking Representation that, “representation, as 
that vital but precarious link between art and history, between experience and reflection, holds 
out the promise, however risky, that trauma can be communicated. But is this promise of 
communication even worth pursuing when its risks tap into representation’s complex 
relationship to history?”2 This is the aim of my project, to explore trans “representation” in 
horror cinema, consciously aware of the risk at hand. Of course, this representation is not merely 
the literal representation of trans bodies onscreen (though that certainly is an important aspect of 
representation), it is also how transness and trans issues and the trans experience are portrayed 
and explored in the darkness of the movie theater. For long before words such as “trans” and 
“transgender” even existed in the popular consciousness, one can see such concepts represented 
in cinema, and especially within horror cinema. 
 
1 Tanis MacDonald. “Out by Sixteen: Queer(ed) Girls in Ginger Snaps.” Jeunesse: Young  
People, Texts, Cultures 3 (2011): 63. 
2 Adam Lowenstein. Shocking Representation: Historical Trauma, National Cinema, and the Modern Horror Film, 
(New York: Columbia Press, 2005), 5. 
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I. TRANS TERMINOLOGY 
 
 Before beginning the analysis, many definitions and explanations of terminology are in 
order. In particular, I want to define and provide context for the terms trans and transgender and 
spell out the relationship between these terms themselves as well as their relation to identity 
labels and to academic discipline. The word “transgender” itself is actually a fairly recent 
development. For much of the 20th century, the terms “transsexual” and “transvestite” were used 
in its place—transsexual for those who had undergone “the operation” and transvestite for those 
who presented female, but still had male genitalia. In her 2008 article concerning the historical 
development of our conception of this relatively new word “transgender” Susan Stryker writes: 
Robert Hill, who has been researching the history of heterosexual male cross-dressing 
communities, found instances in community-based publications of words like transgenderal, 
transgenderist, and transgenderism dating back to the late 1960s. The logic of those terms, used to 
describe individuals who lived in one social gender but had a bodily sex conventionally 
associated with the other, aimed for a conceptual middle ground between transvestism (merely 
changing one’s clothing) and transsexualism (changing one’s sex). By the early 1990s […] 
transgender was beginning to refer to something else—an imagined political alliance of all 
possible forms of gender antinormativity. It was in this latter sense that transgender became 
articulated with queer. This “new transgender” marked both a political and generational 
distinction between older transvestite/transsexual/drag terminologies and an emerging gender  
politics that was explicitly and self-consciously queer.3 
The shift in meaning that the word “transgender” has undergone (and seemingly continues to 
undergo) does make this project of exploring the concept’s relationship with the horror cinema 
somewhat difficult. As an example of this difficulty, consider the character of Norman Bates in 
Psycho (Alfred Hitchcock, 1960). According to the expository dialogue at the end of the film, 
 
3 Susan Stryker. “Transgender History, Homonormativity, and Disciplinarity,” Radical History Review 100 (2008): 
146. 
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Norman suffers from a split-personality.  He is sometimes himself, Norman, and he is sometimes 
his mother Norma. By 1960s terminology (when “transgender” implied a conceptual middle-
ground between “transvestite” and “transsexual”), the Norma-half of Norman’s being would 
likely qualify as “transgender,” but it is unlikely that many viewers today would read Norman 
Bates as transgender—not only because the definition has changed, but also because doing so 
might seem potentially problematic as it might suggest that Norman’s potential transgender 
status is simply a symptom of his psychotic condition, thereby linking transgender people to 
insanity. Despite this, however, I think we must read Norman Bates as “transgender,” not simply 
because he would have historically represented such an idea but also because we ought to treat 
“trans as a modality rather than a category,” meaning that the term is not categorical, that 
transness is, in some ways, context dependent.4  
And, while “transgender” as an identity has been taking shape, a similar process has been 
occurring with transgender studies as an academic discipline. The relationship between these two 
(identity/academic-field) is akin to the relationship between queer as an identity descriptor and 
queer studies as field. In other words, the aim of transgender studies is not to define transgender 
as an identity descriptor, but to explore and critique the complex intersectional relationship 
between gender and (biological) sex. This paper then is both a work of transgender (or really, as 
I shall explain shortly, trans*) studies and cinema studies, wherein I explore the relationship 
between gender and sex with regard to cinema—in particular, horror cinema. 
Because both “transgender” as identity label and “transgender” as field of academic study 
have been rapidly evolving in the past few years, a more recent examination of them is called 
for. The previously quoted Stryker article is from 2008, meaning there has been over a decade of 
 
4 Stryker, “Transgender History,” 148. 
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development in the usage and meaning of these words. In fact, there has been something of a 
turn away from transgender to a more modal and less categorical modifier: trans*. On the 
contemporary development of transgender or trans* studies, Cael M. Keegan writes in his 2020 
article, “What’s Trans* About Queer Studies Now?”: 
Over the past 10 years, trans* studies has gained the status of a recognized field. […] Academia 
appears to have arrived at a “transgender tipping point” (Steinmetz, 2014) beyond which trans* 
studies may find a disciplinary home. Yet the pace and practice of this arrival have been wildly 
uneven: running fully ahead in elite intellectual centers, forced by student activism in others, 
taken up through discourses of weak inclusion in many, and often shot through with 
intergenerational and disciplinary hostilities. The increasing pressure to formalize queer studies 
and women’s studies programs within the neoliberal university also presents epistemic and 
political barriers to trans* studies, which is not equivalent to and values specific breaks from the 
frameworks of both queer theory and academic feminism. Trans* studies scholars and 
pedagogues working within queer and women’s studies contexts often run the risk of becoming  
the problem by bringing up the problem” of trans* studies’ incomplete welcome in these spaces.5 
While trans* studies seems to finally be achieving acceptance as an academic discipline, the 
struggle for its recognition among academia is still ongoing. All too often this field of study is 
simply subsumed by other, more established academic disciplines such as queer studies and 
women’s/gender studies. As Keegan notes, though both of these disciplines are related to trans* 
studies, trans* studies importantly diverges from and may even challenge some aspects of these 
fields. Keegan’s points here about trans* studies’ troubled path to academic recognition are even 
more striking when considered alongside another article by Stryker from 2004 entitled 
“Transgender Studies: Queer Theory’s Evil Twin” in which she proposes that trans* studies has 
something of a monstrous familial relationship with queer theory—the academic discipline it has 
been attempting to separate itself from. She writes: 
 
5 Cael M. Keegan, “Getting Disciplined: What’s Trans* About Queer Studies Now?” Journal of  
Homosexuality 67 (2020): 385-386. 
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If queer theory was born of the union of sexuality studies and feminism, transgender studies can 
be considered queer theory’s evil twin: it has the same parentage but willfully disrupts the 
privileged family narratives that favor sexual identity labels (like gay, lesbian, bisexual, and 
heterosexual) over the gender categories (like man and woman) that enable desire to take shape  
and find its aim.6 
Stryker’s co-opting of horror tropes—the “evil twin” obviously being a well-established cliché of 
cross-media horror—is obviously noteworthy considering the purposes of this essay. Trans 
studies being rendered an evil relative of queer theory is striking as it demonstrates the 
monstrosity of trans studies as a field. But, also of interest, is the fact that while both Stryker and 
Keegan have similar aims (as they both are advocating for a new disciplinary field and both 
specifically expressing a desire for trans*/transgender studies to break from queer theory 
specifically), the most striking difference between them may be the change in the very title of the 
field they are advocating for. Stryker refers to “transgender studies” while Keegan refers to 
“trans* studies.” Thus, we must not only consider what the difference between “queer” and 
“trans/transgender” is, but also the difference between trans and transgender. 
Let us begin with the more obvious distinction, that between queer and transgender. 
Stryker emphasizes ways in which transgender studies breaks from queer studies, but this does 
not mean there is no relation between the two whatsoever. In our colloquial language, those who 
identify as transgender are often grouped under the queer umbrella along with gays, lesbians, and 
bisexuals—yet what is it that aligns transgenderism and homosexuality? They are often 
societally confused with one another and are frequently re/oppressed within said society, and this 
rejection is quite possibly due to the fact that both are perceived as threats to the looming 
hegemony of heteronormativity. As Judith Butler writes, 
 
6 Susan Stryker, “Transgender Studies: Queer Theory’s Evil Twin,” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 10 
(2004): 212. 
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It is important to emphasize that although heterosexuality operates in part through the 
stabilization of gender norms, gender designates a dense site of significations that contain and 
exceed the heterosexual matrix. Whereas it is important to emphasize that forms of sexuality do 
not unilaterally determine gender, a non-causal and nonreductive connection between sexuality  
and gender is nevertheless crucial to maintain.7 
The relationship between sexuality and gender is complicated because, while they are perhaps 
contextually related, they are not a priori ontological truths, nor are they casually linked. Butler 
continues, “the relation between gender and sexuality is in part negotiated through the question 
of the relationship between identification and desire. And here it becomes clear why refusing to 
draw lines of causal implication between these two domains is as important as keeping open an 
investigation of their complex interimplication.”8 This careful navigation of sexuality and gender 
is especially important for this paper in that, while it is ultimately primarily about gender, it is 
also heavily concerned with sexuality. 
As for the difference between transgender and trans, this slight change in terminology 
actually seems quite necessary. Just as the movement from transsexual and transvestite to 
transgender expressed a greater degree of liminality and fluidity, so too does the movement from 
transgender to trans. However, because “transness” is something of a (currently) radical concept, 
it can be somewhat difficult to define. Sara Aguirre-Sánchez-Beato writes about the difficulty of 
defining this term and provides her own definition in her 2018 article, “Trans Terminology and 
Definitions in Research on Transphobia: A Conceptual Review”: 
The very definition of trans people seems to be at the root of discrimination and thus a discursive 
battleground. This battle is manifested, for instance, in trans people’s struggle against the 
pathologising definition of their identities and experiences. The definition of a social category 
both describes and constitutes the category, and has implications for the way in which we 
understand the social world. […] These reflections raise the question of how to flexibly define 
 
7 Judith Butler, “Critically Queer,” Performance Studies (2003), 27. 
8 Ibid, 28. 
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trans people for research purposes without reproducing clear-cut distinctions between trans and 
non-trans people. In this sense, I recommend following Bettcher’s (2015) argument for leaving 
the term ‘trans people’ open to multiple meanings and for offering a minimum definition for 
research purposes. I consider that this definition should revolve around the notions of bodies and 
categories. Therefore, I recommend defining trans people as ‘people who do not comply with 
prevailing expectations about gender embodiment to varying degrees and in different ways’. This 
definition of trans people should be understood as perpetually provisional because, should certain 
forms of gender embodiment not prevail over others, the distinction between the categories  
‘trans’ and ‘non-trans’ would lose all sense.9 
This definition provided by Aguirre will be the one that I will be working with. It encapsulates 
the difference between the restrictive requirements imposed by the identity-label of transgender 
while maintaining its disruptive nature. “Transgender” carries with it some implication as to how 
to perform because it contains the word “gender. This is akin to Butler’s claims about the word 
“girl,” that “it reads less as an assignment than as a command and, as such, produces its own 
insubordinations.”10 “Trans,” on the other hand, shatters these implications by removing the 
concept from the cis-normative, binary-construction of gender entirely. In this paper, I shall use 
the terms transgender (meaning one who identifies as something other than the gender assigned 
at birth), trans (meaning one who does not comply with prevailing expectations about gender 
embodiment to varying degrees and in different ways), transness (meaning the quality or state of 
being trans), and also transfemininity/transwomanhood (the quality of being trans and feminine, 
often in reference to those assigned male at birth but to some degree are feminine with regard to 
identity, expression, or both). These terms—especially the term “trans,” which I shall use fairly 
often, are useful for my purposes because they allow us to better examine the subject of Norman 
 
9 Sara Aguirre-Sánchez-Beato, “Trans Terminology and Definitions in Research on Transphobia: A Conceptual 
Review,” Quaderns de Psicologia 20 (2018): 300. 
10 Butler, “Critically Queer,” 26 
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Bates’ transness. While it is true that Norman may not be transgender, Norman is certainly, 
unmistakably trans. 
One point of interest considering the above articles regarding trans* studies is the fact 
that the very journals these articles were published in are “GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay 
Studies” and the “Journal of Homosexuality.” This may indeed be evidence of their claim that 
trans* studies is often subsumed by queer studies and occasionally women’s/gender studies as 
well. And this is one possible pitfall my essay may fall into, as it deals heavily in some aspects of 
both queer and feminist theory. However, my ultimate aim is that this paper will reveal the 
necessity of a trans* studies lens with which to view horror cinema by looking to those places 
where queer theory and feminist theory seem to be lacking something. My citations of queer and 
feminist theorists are not to conflate nor to subsume trans* studies to them, but to express 
precisely why we need the field of trans* studies in the first place. 
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II. HORROR: FOUNDATIONS, THEORIZATIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS 
 Having established what transness is, we then have the other element of this paper to 
grapple with—horror cinema. Thus, I must provide some sort of explanation of what exactly 
qualifies a film as a “horror film” in the first place. Obviously, such a question is broad and 
deeply complicated and one that I will not be able to thoroughly explore in the scope of this 
paper. However, such a question does bear immediate importance to my purposes—for we must 
have some idea of what a horror film is before we can examine them. Noël Carroll provides one 
potential answer to this question in his book The Philosophy of Horror. For Carroll, 
“arthorror”—which is “horror” as we use it to refer to a cross-media genre of fiction as opposed 
to “natural horror” (e.g. “the horrors of war”)—is defined by the affective relationship it 
normatively has with its audience. His formula for this relationship goes something like this: I 
am art-horrified by a monster if and only if I am in a state of physical agitation that has been 
caused by the thought that said monster is a “possible being,” physically threatening, and 
impure.11  
Let us use Dracula (Carroll’s example) as a demonstration of how this formula operates. 
If a person is engaged with a piece of fiction about Dracula, and they are frightened by the 
possible thought of Dracula’s reality because he is both physically threatening and somehow 
impure—then this person is experiencing art-horror. We should note that Carroll’s theory does 
not require that such an emotional response is actually and successfully instilled in the audience 
members, rather, only that such a response is the kind that works of art-horror are supposed to 
elicit from said audience (i.e. you personally do not need to “be scared” by a horror film for it to 
be a horror film). It is also important to note that—by Carroll’s definition—a monster must have 
 
11 Noël Carroll, The Philosophy of Horror, (New York: Routledge, 1990), 27. 
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both the property of being physically threatening, and also the property of being impure. For if a 
fictitious figure only has the property of being physically threatening (e.g. Darth Vader in Star 
Wars (George Lucas, 1977), then this figure is not a monster; they may be “scary,” but they are 
“(art-)horrifying.” Similarly, if a fictitious figure only has the property of being impure (e.g. 
Divine when she eats the dog shit in Pink Flamingos (John Waters, 1972), then this figure is also 
not a monster—they may elicit a reaction of disgust and possibly revulsion, but not one of art-
horror. 
The usage of the word “impure” in Carroll’s theory is immediately striking, especially in 
light of queer people’s historical relation to the concept of impurity. Carroll’s illustration of the 
impurity of monsters is as follows, “that they are putrid or moldering, or they hail from oozing 
places, or they are made of dead or rotting flesh, or chemical waste, or are associated with 
vermin, disease, or crawling things.”12 In other words, the monster is in some way gross or 
repugnant. Though it seems to me that the word “impurity” carries some stronger implications as 
well—implications related to the “un-tainted-ness” of an object, particularly as it relates to 
matters of the body and especially sex. This is not something that Carroll explores, but this 
relation between “impure” as in gross and “impure” as in (deviantly) sexual is hard to ignore 
considering the sexuality present in many horror films, even from the early days of Hollywood 
(this is a point which will become clearer during my discussion of Benshoff in the upcoming 
pages). 
 From Carroll’s formula for how horror as a multi-media genre operates on an audience, 
we can turn to Robin Wood’s formula for how horror operates in cinema specifically. This 
formula, which Wood developed in American Nightmare: Essays on the Horror Film, is only 
 
12 Ibid, 23. 
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this: “Normality is threatened by the Monster.”13 Wood’s formula fits easily with Carroll’s as 
they both seem to locate the proper site of horror within the figure of the Monster. Yet, while 
Wood’s formula first appears rather simple, it actually offers something a bit more substantive: 
Although so simple, the formula provides three variables: normality, the Monster, and, crucially 
the relationship between the two. The definition of normality is horror films is in general boringly 
constant: the heterosexual monogamous couple, the family, and the social institutions (police, 
church, armed forces) that support and defend them. The Monster is, of course, much more 
protean, changing from period to period as society’s basic fears clothe themselves in fashionable  
or immediately accessible garments.14 
Wood’s formula can be observed even in very early works of what we would now call horror. 
Consider one of the earliest surviving films by one of the influential early filmmakers, Georges 
Méliès’ The Vanishing Lady (Georges Méliès, 1896). The film consists of a simple trick in which 
Méliès, through the use of jump-cuts, transforms a woman into a skeleton before transforming 
the skeleton back into the woman. Here, we can clearly see Wood’s formula at work. The 
woman and Méliès are signs of normality at the film’s outset—they are representatives of 
heterosexual monogamy, of the family. When the woman is transformed into a skeleton, this 
normality is perverted into monstrosity and the implied heterosexual monogamy is substituted 
for death and even possible necrophilia. However, the film “defeats” the monster and restores 
normality when Méliès “magically” transforms the skeleton back into the woman, reversing the 
earlier perversion and leaving his audience momentarily frightened, but ultimately relieved by 
the return to the normal. 
While Carroll’s formula for horror seems more concerned with an audience’s relation to 
the Monster, Wood seems concerned with why exactly said Monster was created in the first 
 
13 Robin Wood, American Nightmare: Essays on the Horror Film (Toronto: Festival of Festivals, 1979), 14. 
14 Ibid. 
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place; yes, the audience is supposed to be scared of the Monster, but why is the audience 
supposed to be scared? This question has itself produced its own sub-category of horror theory: 
monster theory. This is unsurprising as the figure of the Monster is so central to horror. Because 
the Monster is positioned in opposition to normality, horror cinema can easily become and is 
often read as politically regressive, as fear-mongering moral fables attempting to preserve the 
status-quo from some nefarious other. Monster theory, however, often complicates such a 
reading of horror. For instance, Elaine Graham writes in her essay, “The Gates of Difference”, 
that, “the monster, that which refuses to abide by axiomatic orderings, carries a terrible threat to 
expose the fragility of its defining categories and thus the fiction of normality itself.”15 Another 
theorist, Jeffrey Cohen adds: 
Monsters are our children. They can be pushed to the farthest margins of geography and 
discourse, hidden away at the edges of the world and in the forbidden recesses of our mind, but 
they always return. And when they come back, they bring not just a fuller knowledge of our place 
in history and the history of knowing our place, but they bear self- knowledge, human knowledge,  
and a discourse all the more sacred as it arises from the Outside.16 
Such claims reveal that the Monster is not just a sign that signifies that which is other, but that 
Monsters are always signs of a particular other. Any given Monster reveals to us something 
about our own societal baggage and concerns while also potentially shattering our constructed 
binaries and categories of being. The Monster’s complexity is further emphasized by a point 
Wood makes, which is that “few horror films have totally unsympathetic Monsters; in many 
ways the Monster is clearly the emotional centre, and much more human than the cardboard 
representatives of normality.”17  
 
15 Elaine Graham, Representations of Post/Human: Monsters, Aliens, and Others in Popular Culture (New Jersey: 
Rutgers University Press, 2002), 54. 
16 Jeffery Cohen, Monster Theory: Reading Culture (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 20. 
17 Robin Wood, American Nightmare: Essays on the Horror Film (Toronto: Festival of Festivals, 1979), 15. 
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 This highlights one area of Carroll’s initial theory that requires expansion. While it may 
be true that the monster is typically meant to elicit “arthorror” reactions, is there not also a 
possibility that the audience may identify with the Monster? It was, after all, my own 
identification with Ginger in Ginger Snaps that inspired me to write this paper in the first place. 
There are, of course, numerous ways in which one can identify with the Monster. Rhona 
Berenstein, in her book Attack of the Leading Ladies: Gender, Sexuality, and Spectatorship in 
Classic Horror Cinema, provides a classic example of this process in the final scene of the film 
King Kong (Merian C. Cooper, Ernest B. Schoedsack, 1933), 
in which Denham (Robert Armstrong), the film director who heads the expedition to the 
creature’s island and brings Kong back to New York for a brief but memorable stint on stage, 
recites an epitaph about beauty killing the beast. Denham is far from sympathetic character and 
his summation of the proceedings is rendered without emotion or sensitivity. Despite Denham’s 
distanced meditation, however, spectators may well sympathize and identify with Kong’s tragic  
fate.18 
Kong is a useful example for illustrating the potential of sympathy for the monster, but I find that 
the truth of these claims can be even more readily observed in the most iconic movie Monster of 
all time, Frankenstein’s Monster (the Monster who is only known by the name Monster). 
Frankenstein’s Monster goes further than mere sympathy by essentially becoming a tragic hero 
in Frankenstein (James Whale, 1931). Karloff imbues the corpselike character with much more 
emotion and humanity than is allowed to the film’s human characters. And, by the film’s 
conclusion, one cannot help but feel a compassion for the misunderstood Monster as the mob of 
“normal people” attempts to remove his perceived perversion from existence. The Monster also 
 
18 Rhona Berenstein, Attack of the Leading Ladies: Gender, Sexuality, and Spectatorship in Classic Horror Cinema 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 20-21. 
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serves as a reminder of homosexuality in that his existence is brought about not by heterosexual 
procreation, but by the perverse experiments of Frankenstein and Igor, a male-male couple.  
 Here, a different element of horror cinema comes into play: the genre’s longstanding 
relationship to queerness and to queer people. The director of Frankenstein, James Whale, was, 
in fact, a gay man whose homosexuality was an open secret in Hollywood. He even developed an 
alleged nickname, “The Queen of Hollywood.”19 Whale’s nickname highlights the importance of 
gender performativity in early Hollywood and underscores the historic confusion between 
transness and homosexuality. In his own nickname, Whale’s gender identity and sexuality are 
confused. The moniker of “queen” is even more striking now that it was then, instantly conjuring 
images of drag, the explicit and exaggerated playing with and violation of gender performativity 
norms. Because Whale’s sexuality (and debatable gender-deviance) was so widely known, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that his personal life and attitudes often leaked their way into his films—
especially his horror pieces. As Harry Benshoff writes: 
Most critics will agree that there is to be found within Whale's work something that might be 
termed a "gay sensibility." What this might mean is the sensibility of a man who recognizes his 
status as a sexual outsider, someone who acknowledges his difference from the heterosexualized 
hegemony, and uses that distanciation as a way to comment upon it. […] His films are filled with  
jibes against Christian morality and heterocentrist pretension.20 
This may partially explain why the Monster becomes the most sympathetic character in Whale’s 
adaptation of Frankenstein—while in the original book the reader’s sympathy lies slightly more 
with Frankenstein himself (it is, after all, entirely told in his voice)—because Whale himself was 
also considered “not normal.”  
 
19 Gregory William Mank, Hollywood Cauldron (Jefferson, NC: MacFarland & Company Inc., 1994) 34. 
20 Harry Benshoff, Monsters in the Closet: Homosexuality and the Horror Film (Indiana: Manchester University 
Press, 1998), 41. 
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To return to Wood’s formula for horror cinema—that normality is threatened by the 
monster and—we can see why American horror cinema (especially of early to mid 20th century) 
was so frequently tinged with or even submerged in queerness. For most of American cinema’s 
existence, normality has been defined by heterosexuality, while monstrosity has been defined by 
the homosexuality and other “deviant” sexual behaviors (e.g. sadomasochism, bestiality, 
necrophilia, incest, etc.). For a long time, it was thought (or rather taught by the Western Judeo-
Christian tradition) that any sexual activity outside of marital procreation was somehow deviant 
and evil as such activities are, in some capacity, related to the idea of death. Leo Bersani notes 
that this correlation between homosexual sex and death reached its peak during the AIDS crisis 
in his essay, “Is the Rectum a Grave?”—but, this correlation has always been present in horror 
cinema.21  
This relation between taboo sexuality and death is obviously the present in Frankenstein, 
as the monster, the product of a homosexual union, is a literal liminality, a perverted imitation of 
life made up out of that which is dead. But this is also the case in the traditional vampire 
narrative, where the bite (read: kiss) of the vampire perverts the subject and produces in them a 
state akin to death in its victim. The zombie, then, can merely be seen as the epidemic evolution 
of such an idea. While the narratives of Universal’s classic mummy films always conjure images 
of necrophilia (the long-dead corpse always pursuing the affections of a young, alive woman), 
the narratives of their classic wolfman films always conjure images of bestiality in much the 
same way. Indeed, there are many examples of classic horror films which express perverted 
sexual desire—desire which is un-procreative and thus aligned with death. Their existence 
speaks directly to Carroll’s requirement that the monster be “impure”—often this impurity is 
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related to a kind of deviant sexuality, the kind of the thing that would most readily be read as 
impure by early 20th century filmgoing audiences. The mummy is impure because he is a corpse, 
but he is even more impure in that his desire implies necrophilia.  
The relation between monstrosity and “sex-perversion” is not only embedded within 
horror cinema, but it can also be observed in many pieces of anti-gay propaganda, which clearly 
play into this perceived correlation. One such example is Boys Beware (Sid Davis, 1961) an 
“educational” homophobic short shown in public schools. The film depicts homosexuals as 
nearly-vampiric beings who prey on little boys. The narrator’s description of “the homosexuals” 
could easily be confused for a description of Dracula—he calls them “sick,” “contagious,” and 
claims that they even cast “spells” with their “glamour.” This shared and societally-bestowed 
“deviancy” between a prospective queer viewer and the onscreen Monster renders the Monster 
even more sympathetic to them than to the unassuming, straight viewer. To quote Benshoff 
again: 
While the classical horror film encourages everyone in the audience to understand these narrative 
patterns from a queer perspective, it was probably easier for homosexual men and women to do 
so on a more regular basis. Because of their already disenfranchised location outside of the 
dominant culture, or their practice at leading "double" lives, many homosexual spectators of the 
genre would perhaps be more likely than heterosexual ones to identify with the figure of the 
monster or villain, even as he or she was eventually vanquished by the narrative's heterosexist 
agents. This facet of gay and lesbian readership (making do with less than optimal 
representations) is today still a facet of how non-straight people negotiate popular media texts. 
[…] Queer spectators may identify with a monster such as the lesbian vampire, enjoying her 
exploits for the majority of the film's running time, while ultimately discounting the patented  
narrative resolution and its concomitant reinstatement of heterosexual norms.22 
 
22 Benshoff, Monsters in the Closet, 37. 
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The queer viewer’s relation to the horror film has been the subject of much discussion. 
Similarly, the complicated gendered viewing practices of the horror film have also been 
thoroughly written upon. Berenstein, for instance, discusses the importance of drag in classic 
horror cinema—both within the texts of the films themselves and also as an activity participated 
in by the spectators of such films. She writes:  
As a sexually and ontologically ambiguous figure, the monster complicates a rigid one-to-one 
rapport with spectators […] Classic horror’s representations offer a schism between spectator 
(human) and monster (non-human) in viewing terms. That schism is compounded by the divide  
between character (monster) and role (man) that plays out at the diegetic level.23 
This process, Berenstein claims, is akin to the practice of drag in that identification with the 
monster crosses binaries. These can be binaries of human/non-human, living/dead, and, of 
course, male/female. This observation ties neatly into monster theory, but places greater 
emphasis on the perverse, heretical nature of the spectator’s relationship with the monster. In 
other words, “one pleasure offered by classic horror viewings is identifying against oneself.”24 
This identification against oneself naturally extends itself to cross-gender (or even trans-
gender) identification. For instance, while examining the slasher films of the 70s and 80s, Carol 
Clover theorized that there was a kind of cross-gender identification that occurred in male 
audience viewers who watched such films. Clover is centrally concerned with, “the appeal to a 
largely male audience of a film genre that features a female victim-hero.”25   
That the slasher film speaks deeply and obsessively to male anxieties and desires seems clear—if 
nothing else from the maleness of the majority audience. And yet these are texts in which the 
categories masculine and feminine […] are collapsed into one and the same character. […] The 
willingness and even eagerness (so we judge from these films' enormous popularity) of the male 
 
23 Berenstein, Attack of the Leading Ladies, 43-44. 
24 Ibid, 58. 
25 Carol Clover, Men, Women, and Chainsaws: Gender in the Modern Horror Film (New Jersey: Prinecton 
University Press, 1997), 44. 
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viewer to throw in his emotional lot, if only temporarily, with not only a woman but a woman in 
fear and pain, at least in the first instance, would seem to suggest that he has a vicarious stake in 
that fear and pain. If it is also the case that the act of horror spectatorship is itself registered as a 
"feminine" experience—that the shock effects induce in the viewer bodily sensations answering  
the fear and pain of the screen victim—the charge of masochism is underlined.26 
Clover’s theory is that the horror film provides a unique avenue for a male viewer to experience 
a kind of feminization. This is true for all horror films in that every horror film is intended to 
frighten the audience—thus allowing male viewers to engage with and even embrace their 
“irrational, sentimental, emotional, spiritual, vulnerable side.”27 However, this claim is 
heightened by the fact that many horror films—especially those in the slasher subgenre—feature 
female protagonists. 
One possible concern to consider at this juncture might be that these theories perhaps 
make transfeminine horror fans apt targets for some rather harsh, dubious psychoanalysis. 
Indeed, a particularly skeptical psychoanalyst might claim that my own transfemininity is 
actually a result of my affinity for horror cinema—as if I have been sutured to Laurie Strode and 
delighted in the “feminizing experience” of screaming one time too many. And this possibility 
was something that legitimately troubled me upon first reading Clover’s work with relation to the 
slasher subgenre. Yet, I propose that this causal chain happens in the opposite direction. My 
dysphoric feelings were precisely the thing that drew me to horror as a genre originally. Unlike 
other genres of film that primarily feature female protagonists (e.g. melodrama), horror allowed 
me to experience a kind of feminization and cross-gender (or perhaps, trans-gender) 
identification without drawing the attention that a boy really loving melodrama might draw. In 
 
26 Ibid, 61. 
27 Ibid, xiii. 
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this way, horror has always allowed me a sort of covert transgender identification—even though 
I was not explicitly aware of what was occurring until I read Men, Women, and Chainsaws. 
While theorists like Benshoff and Clover have explored the horror genre’s relation to 
sexuality and gender respectively in great detail, there is one thing aspect that is left out of their 
discussions. While, Clover’s Men, Women, and Chainsaws is a foundational work in the 
examination of the gender dynamics within the modern horror film and while it concerns itself 
with cross-gender identification, the word “transgender” does not appear anywhere in the book 
(though the word “transsexual” does appear twice, once within a David Cronenberg quote and 
once referring to the character of Buffalo Bill as a “would-be transsexual”).28 Yet, Clover’s 
consideration of “cross-gender” viewing practices seems ripe for further consideration from a 
trans studies perspective, especially since other theorists have gone so far as to claim that horror 
cinema “allows young male viewers to engage in (unrecognized) transgender experiences.”29 
Claims this provocative certainly deserve greater consideration from trans studies scholars. 
Similarly, the term “transgender” never appears in one of the primary texts for 
understanding horror cinema in relation to queerness and homosexuality, Benshoff’s Monsters in 
the Closet—although, again, the term “transsexual” is used twice (but only in relation to the 
cross-dressing director Ed Wood). Yet again, Benshoff’s theories also seem apt for trans studies 
consideration—especially given the historical confusion between the two and some of 
Benshoff’s own claims, such as his statement that “traditional models of gender inversion are 
invoked to suggest […] queer otherness.”30 The fact that transness is not directly considered by 
 
28 Ibid, 28. 
29 Daniel Humphrey, “Gender and Sexuality Haunt the Horror Film,” in A Companion to the Horror Film, ed. Harry 
Benshoff (New Jersery: Wiley-Blackwell, 2017), 40. 
30 Benshoff, Monsters in the Closet, 272. 
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either Benshoff or Clover is not necessarily an oversight on either of their parts of Clover and 
Benshoff, but the topic likely deserves further exploration and analysis. 
One of the few places I found explicit analysis of transness in horror cinema was in a 
chapter in the book, Transgender on Screen by John Phillips.31 The chapter in question is entitled 
“Psycho-Trans” and examines a few explicit portrayals of trans-identities within horror cinema, 
namely Psycho, Dressed to Kill (Brian De Palma, 1980), The Silence of the Lambs (Jonathan 
Demme, 1991), and Cherry Falls (Geoffrey Wright, 2000). Yet Phillips’s aim with this chapter 
seems to be a condemnation of these films for their association of transness with psychopathy as 
he ends each section on each film with comments like “the film […] conveys a generally 
negative impression. The implied messages are that gender dysphoria is a state of uncertainty 
[…] that might even lead to psychosis and murder.”32 While it is true that the practice of 
associating transness with murderous impulses (a common trope of horror and thriller films) is 
dubious and harmful, I believe that there is more to be discovered—both within these horror 
texts that explicitly depict transness (even in such a negative light) and also in other horror texts 
which may not be so blunt about their trans representation. Phillips’s argument almost appears to 
easy to make, but I intend to do something closer to the examinations of the genre undertaken by 
the likes of Clover and (especially) of Benshoff, both of whom have been touchstones in my 
personal understanding of horror. 
While Benshoff’s and Clover’s theories are indispensable with regard to understanding 
horror cinema, it seems to me that there are other viewing practices to consider further. Benshoff 
and Clover seem to hint at the kind of viewing experience that I have when I watch a film like 
Ginger Snaps… or a film like Cat People. It seems to me that, while a lesbian viewer may 
 
31 Phillips, John. Transgender on Screen. (Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
32 Ibid, 106. 
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identify with the pursuits of Countess Zaleska in Dracula’s Daughter (Lambert Hillyer, 1936) as 
she searches for a female partner—fearing the scorn and wrath of the surrounding society which 
resents her lifestyle, I argue that a similar process can occur within a transfeminine viewer 
watching a film such as Cat People (Jacques Tourneur, 1942).  
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III. CAT PEOPLE: A STUDY OF TRANS SUBTEXT IN CLASSIC HORROR 
 Like Ginger Snaps, Cat People has traditionally also been read as a lesbian subtextual 
narrative. In fact, this lesbian reading was so prevalent—even in the 1940s that the film’s 
screenwriter, DeWitt Bodeen, was once quoted saying that the producer of the film, Val Lewton, 
Got several letters after Cat People was released, congratulating him for his boldness in 
introducing lesbiana to films in Hollywood… Actually, I rather like the insinuation and thought it 
added a neat bit of interpretation to the scene. Irena's fears about destroying a lover if she kissed  
him could be because she was really a lesbian who loathed being kissed by a man.33 
While there is definitely potential for a lesbian reading of Cat People, it appears to me that it has 
another untapped potential in its possible trans subtext. This chapter will explore the potentiality 
for such a reading in Cat People, in order to serve as a case study for how such subtexts often 
exist in horror films—even in those from Hollywood’s golden age, far before the existence of 
trans* studies as a discipline. In short, Cat People, while ostensibly a narrative about a woman 
who is a were-cat, can be read as a subtextual narrative about a stealth transwoman (that is, a 
transwoman who lives her life as a woman and is not “out” regarding her transgender identity)—
just as Dracula’s Daughter, while ostensibly a narrative about a woman who is a vampire, can be 
read as a subtextual narrative about a closeted, repressing lesbian.  
To better illustrate this subtext, I shall more closely examine the film’s narrative. In its 
first scene, the film immediately makes it clear that there is something “off” about Irena, initially 
established by her reserved-ness and foreign-ness. These are traits that, in classical Hollywood 
cinema, often identify a character as queer-coded, as Benshoff notes, “it was not uncommon for 
audiences to think of foreign lands, and Europe especially, as the site of sexual decadence, the 
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birthplace of Oscar Wilde and others of his ilk.”34 Her strangeness is exemplified even further in 
an early scene of her and her straight cis-male suitor, Oliver, wherein she says such cryptic 
things as “I like the dark” and explains the history of “her people” to him. She tells him a story 
of how her village was once overtaken by creatures called mamluks. She says,  
You see, the mamluks came to Serbia long ago and they made the people slaves. Well, at first, the 
people were good and worshipped God in a true Christian way. But little by little, the people 
changed. When King John drove out the mamluks and came to our village he found dreadful 
things. People bowed down to Satan and said their Masses to him. They had become witches and 
were evil. Well, King John put some of them to the sword but some—the wisest and the most  
wicked—escaped into the mountains. 
The first thing to note here is that the reference to mamluks further establishes the “foreign 
threat” of Irena, but it also subtly establishes her, shall we say, “genital otherness” due to the 
mamluks historical relationship to genital mutilation. But this quote will also resonate as perhaps 
all too familiar for many queer viewers raised in America due to the dominance of so-called 
“Judeo-Christian values” which traditionally hold that homosexuality is both threatening and 
impure (i.e. it is monstrous), a malicious sin and a rejection of God’s divine will. I know that this 
was at least my experience attending a Catholic school throughout my adolescence. The imagery 
of witchcraft often serves to queer code a character as well, based upon the historical link 
between witchcraft and queerness to consider, which Benshoff explains. 
The linkage of homosexuals and witchcraft within popular understanding has a long and tangled 
history […] Certainly many of the women (and men) put to death for witchcraft throughout the 
preceding centuries might have been considered homosexual by twentieth-century definitions. 
And it is part of gay folklore, apocryphal or not, that the term “faggot” comes from the fagots  
thrown onto the fires used to burn such victims at the stake.35 
 
34 Benshoff, Monsters in the Closet, 59. 
35 Ibid, 103. 
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When Oliver attempts to kiss her, she says to him that she has lived “in dread of this 
moment” and that she has “fled from the past” from some things which he “could never 
understand.” This then establishes the essential fact, though Irena desires Oliver (i.e. she has 
heterosexual desire) she cannot kiss him because she is afraid that she will be rejected for the 
“monstrosity” of her body. Furthermore, the idea of “not knowing” is central to the horror genre. 
As Graham writes, “monsters stand at the entrance to the unknown, acting as gatekeepers to the 
acceptable.”36 The knowledge which Irena possesses, the knowledge that Oliver cannot 
understand, makes her a monster. This “unknowable knowledge” is not just correlated with 
monstrosity, but also with queerness. In children, we think of innocence as relating to 
unknowing, specifically when it comes to matters of sexuality. But since queer sexualities have 
been forbidden—even adults are not allowed to “know” them. This ancient idea of forbidden 
“carnal knowledge” can be traced back to the Bible, a foundation of Western Judeo-Christian 
morality: 
But before they lay down, the men of the city, even the men of Sodom, compassed the house 
round, both young and old, all the people from every quarter; and they called unto Lot, and said 
unto him, Where are the men that came in to thee this night? bring them out unto us, that we may  
know them.37 
This passage, from the story of Sodom and Gomorrah in the book of Genesis, directly relates 
homosexuality and knowledge. Indeed, other translations make this connection even more 
explicit: “bring them out to us so that we can have sex with them” reads the New International 
Version.38 And, by the conclusion of this story, the Sodomites are clearly portrayed and judged 
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as monstrous. Irena’s simple claim that she has knowledge that Oliver cannot have subtly marks 
her as a queer outsider and a potential monstrous threat. 
Though, it is possible that all of this could merely code Irena as lesbian. But, an essential 
narrative aspect of the film, which a lesbian reading might ignore, is Irena’s clear desire to be 
with Oliver; she wants to kiss him, but is afraid of what might happen if she does. It also must 
also be noted that Irena’s refusal of Oliver’s kiss in this scene is not merely to be read as a 
refusal of a kiss, but of sex. During the Hayes code era, a depiction or even frank discussion of 
sex could not be present, so Irena’s concerns here may be representative of physical carnality 
itself, not just this one kiss. This point is repeatedly furthered throughout the film. Oliver even 
marries Irena simply in order that—as he seems to understand it—he can have sex with her. 
When Irena refuses physical carnality even after their marriage, Oliver becomes so distraught at 
Irena’s refusal to consummate their marriage, while Irena continues to say more suspicious 
things, like her claim that she envies “every woman she sees on the street” because they have 
something which she does not—which is, of course, the ability to consummate their love because 
they will not be rejected by the society that surrounds them. 
Eventually, however, Oliver pressures her into seeing a psychoanalyst, believing that 
doing so will “cure” her. Irena goes to one meeting with this psychoanalyst and never returns—
though afterwards she has nightmares wherein she imagines the psychoanalyst as King John, the 
man who drove out the “evil” mamluks. Obviously, Irena is no way “cured” and because she still 
refuses carnality with Oliver, he finally decides to simply divorce Irena so he may begin a 
relationship with his co-worker, Alice (perhaps he is hoping this one will include sex?). This 
deeply upsets Irena—which is important to note as it further establishes that Irena actually does 
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have romantic feelings towards Oliver, despite her inability/unwillingness to have sex with him. 
In fact, Irena is so upset by this that she begins aggressively stalking Oliver’s new beau Alice.  
The scene wherein Irena follows Alice to the pool is interesting because it is directly after 
this scene that Alice states she has come to believe Irena’s “story.” This too supports my reading, 
as pools and their adjacent locker rooms would be one of the places where Irena’s transness 
might accidentally be revealed to Alice. Such spaces may also be a site of terror—both for 
transwomen and for certain “unexpecting” ciswomen. Indeed, the bathroom has been something 
of a primary battleground in the fight for trans rights. And similar fears once surrounded 
homosexuality, as the aforementioned scare film Boys Beware claims in a scene which depicts a 
boy being pursued by a homosexual at a public beach, “public restrooms can often be a hangout 
for the homosexual.” The fact that the restroom and areas such as the beach and the pool have 
always been battlegrounds for such issues is unsurprising—not only because they often involve 
less clothing than usual and thus possible exposure to nudity and subsequently sexuality, but also 
because they are seen as sites of potential contamination. This sort of contamination is precisely 
the kind of “impure” thing that is essential to the formation of an art-horror monster for Carroll. 
According to fearmongering films such as Boys Beware, it seems that, for much of American 
history and even still to this day, queer people have been monsters. It is this pool scene that 
finally establishes the “impurity” of Irena. Once Alice becomes aware that Irena has been near 
the pool, she no longer desires to swim in it.  
 It is, however, the climax of the film that truly crystalizes my reading of the film. Irena 
first appears (in “cat-form”) to Oliver and his new beau Alice as they are preparing to leave 
work, but Irena is chased away by Oliver wielding a makeshift cross, a symbol of the Christian 
God which harkens back to Irena’s early comments about the mamluks while solidifying the idea 
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that there is something impure and threatening about Irena (i.e. that she is monster) while also 
suggesting that Christianity is the proper way to combat such monstrosity. After being expelled 
by Oliver’s vigilant Christianity, Irena goes to her psychoanalyst, Dr. Judd, who essentially 
forces himself upon her. When he kisses her, however, something strange happens. The camera 
cuts to a shot of Irena’s face slowly being subsumed by shadow, before cutting to a shot of Dr. 
Judd drawing a phallic weapon against Irena and attacking her. In these two instances, Irena 
grants Oliver, Alice, and Dr. Judd access to her unknowable knowledge and is thus revealed to 
be a monster—a gatekeeper of the unknown. Irena’s knowledge is different from the knowledge 
often held by gay characters in that it is not about her sexuality but about her very person. To 
demonstrate, while the unknowable knowledge held by the excessively queer Dr. Pretorius in  
Bride of Frankenstein (James Whale, 1935) pertains to an activity (his acts of procreation 
without heterosexuality, the homosocial/sexual bond between Frankenstein and himself ), the 
unknowable knowledge held by Irena pertains to her body itself. Dr. Judd does not discover 
anything about Irena’s activity or desire by knowing her carnally (the audience has already been 
made aware of her desire for Oliver), he only discovers the “monstrosity” of her body. Thus, 
while both homosexuality and transness are marked by a secret knowledge, the former is 
knowledge of one’s desire, while the latter is knowledge of one’s very identity. 
Let us consider the two distinct reactions of Oliver and Dr. Judd in closer detail. Oliver’s 
reaction is striking in that it depicts Christianity as an effective combatant against monstrosity 
and “unknowable knowledge” (or simply, knowledge of deviant sexualities and identities). But 
Dr. Judd’s reaction is perhaps even more interesting in that interaction he has with Irena reads 
exactly like a moment of “gay panic”: a horrible and horribly common phenomenon wherein 
(typically) men violently attack homosexual men, or—as in this case—transwomen. It is in this 
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moment of carnal consummation that Irena’s monstrosity is finally explicitly “revealed” to a 
member of the cis-normative and transphobic society and the person she has been “outed” to 
tries to kill her. Irena kills Dr. Judd in self-defense, but then she runs to the zoo and frees a 
panther which kills her. Irena has been outed as monstrous and does not feel as though she can 
live in this world anymore, so she takes her own life. The freed panther then immediately runs 
into the street where it is hit by a car and killed. The film concludes with Oliver saying that Irena 
“never lied” (since her secret has now been revealed) and then an intertitle taken from a poem 
that reads “But black sin hath betrayed to endless night / My world’s both parts and both parts 
must die”. Both “parts” of Irena are dead, her public female self, and her private, “monstrous” 
trans-self. 
 Through Wood’s aforementioned formula for horror, i.e. that “normality is threatened by 
the monster, the sub-textual reflection upon transphobia in Cat People becomes even more 
blatant. As long as Irena is able to pass as a “normal” girl, she is accepted and even sought after 
by straight men. It is only when her violation of heteronormativity is revealed that she becomes 
figured as “monstrous” to the audience and the other characters of the film. The fear which the 
film centers around appears to be precisely the kind of fear suggested by the gay panic defense: 
the fear that straight people around you might really be queer people in disguise. This is one of 
the most common societal fears expressed in horror cinema, especially of the classical 
Hollywood era.  
Yet, this regressive reading of the film is complicated by the fact that Irena is the clearest 
point of suture in the film—even for straight audience members. Like King Kong or the Monster 
in Frankenstein, Irena is by far the film’s most sympathetic character. She is the protagonist of 
the story and the film essentially presents her narrative as one of tragedy. Thus, the central fear 
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of Cat People could be interpreted as the fear experienced by closeted queer people, whose lives 
may be put in jeopardy if they are outed. Cat People may initially appear transphobic in that it 
ties transness with monstrosity, but—like the tie between homosexuality and monstrosity—this 
is not a societal connection that the film itself is creating, but rather one it is reflecting on. 
Furthermore, we must consider the “against-the-grain” reading processes which queer people 
have developed with regards to most forms of media, including cinema. As Berenstein writes, “if 
monsters are the most compelling figures in these stories, and I believe they are, their destruction 
at the end of the films does little to quell the anxieties sparked during the bulk of the narrative.”39 
This especially true when regarding the relationship of the queer audience to early horror films, 
which pathetically return the audience safely back to the realm of heteronormativity after 
allowing them to delight in the pleasure of queer identification for the rest of the film’s runtime. 
For queer audiences, this cheap return to heteronormativity at the conclusion of many horror 
films could be easily disregarded. Those five minutes of “required” heteronormativity do not 
undo the ninety minutes of queer subversion that preceded them. 
This is as much the case for Cat People as it is for Dracula’s Daughter, which features a 
similar, tragic end for its heroine. A queer reading of Cat People finds it to be yet another horror 
story wherein the audience (especially its queer members) identify with the character of the 
sympathetic monster, whilst discounting the film’s ultimate conclusion, where Irena is killed, 
thereby reinstating a sense of heteronormativity and relieving the straight audience, providing 
them with a “happy ending” after they have perversely enjoyed the queering experience of the 
film and their suture to a queer character. Cat People is distinct from most of the films discussed 
by Benshoff only in that it invites identification with a character subtextually coded as trans, 
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rather than one coded as homosexual. Of course, this confusion is not surprising, as Benshoff 
notes, the prevailing “theory” of homosexuality during the 1930s and 40s was one of “gender 
inversion”—meaning it was thought that gay men were women trapped in men’s bodies and gay 
women were men trapped in women’s bodies. Of course, this theory would eventually become 
the prevailing theory about transgender people, yet today we have mostly moved away from it 
entirely. In any case, the historical confusion between transness and homosexuality has perhaps 
incorrectly labeled many early instances of transness in cinema as instances of homosexuality. 
Cat People is only one such example. 
Irena’s status as a cinematic monster is unique because, while she fits all the 
requirements for the horror theories of Carroll and Wood, and monster theory, and has 
traditionally been read as a lesbian—it appears to me that she actually is a transwoman. 
However, the fact that she has historically been read as lesbian illustrates both society’s 
conflation/confusion of the two concepts and also the fact that transgender and trans are fairly 
recent phenomenological and conceptual developments. To return to Butler’s distinction between 
gender and sexuality, Irena’s monstrosity is not derived from her desire/sexuality (in fact, she 
seems quite good at containing her sexual desire for Oliver) but rather from her identity/gender. 
Irena is not a monster because she wishes to marry Oliver—in any other Hollywood film of this 
period, that would make her something of a model woman—no, she is a monster because she is a 
girl who is perceived as not a girl. She is a monster because she is both threatening and impure, 
because she threatens the state of normality, because he has unknowable knowledge, and because 
of her liminal identity. She is a profound exemplar of the monstrous in that she “carries a terrible 
threat to expose the fragility of […] defining categories and thus the fiction of normality itself.”40 
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CONCLUSION: TRANSNESS AND MONSTROSITY 
 Of course, there are many more films to consider besides Cat People. For starters, there is 
an entire history of explicit transvestism and transsexuality on display in horror cinema, 
especially during the 20th century, where such topics were nowhere more prevalent in visual 
culture than in the realm of the horrific. Hitchcock’s Psycho was already mentioned in this piece, 
but let us not forget its imitators and descendants, which are as variable as the cheap, immediate 
cash-in rip-off Homicidal (William Castle, 1961) and the auteur-driven, aesthetically-defined 
Dressed to Kill,  which both feature the same gender-bending twist as Psycho. Even looking at 
two icons of 20th century horror visual culture, we can see unique and distinct representations of 
transness. Compare the Dr. Frank-N-Furter of The Rocky Horror Picture Show (Jim Sharman, 
1975), who is entirely defined by his transvestism, which Leatherface from The Texas Chainsaw 
Massacre (Tobe Hooper, 1974) whose transvestism, despite his ubiquitous presence and iconic 
status, is rarely (if ever) acknowledged, let alone examined in detail. 
And then there is no shortage of less iconic horror films which also use explicit 
transvestism as a marker of monstrosity, such as Beyond the Valley of the Dolls (Russ Meyer, 
1970), Three on a Meathook (William Girdler, 1972), Deranged (Jeff Gillen, Alan Ormsby, 
1974), and Stripped to Kill (Katt Shea, 1987). Yet, even films as popular and acclaimed as The 
Silence of the Lambs feature very explicit, grotesque, and problematic depictions of 
transsexuality—alongside cheap low-brow trash such as Ticked-Off Trannies with Knives (Israel 
Luna, 2010). But it is not merely transvestites and transsexuals who are so often depicted as 
monstrous in horror films, there are even portrayals of literal transgendered characters, such as in 
the rather popular Sleepaway Camp franchise.  
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But such obvious onscreen depictions of transness are not the ones that interest me the 
most. Instead, it is films like Cat People and Ginger Snaps that are the most fascinating—films 
that are able to communicate an experience of transness without ever bringing their trans 
elements to the surface of their texts. For starters, there are many tales of monstrous mutations, 
changes within one’s own body that frighten and disturb. Specifically, there is a plethora of films 
akin to Cat People and Ginger Snaps—films about secretly monstrous, transformed women, 
such as The Wasp Woman (Roger Corman, 1959) or even something as contemporary as The 
Lure (Agnieszka Smoczynska, 2015)—which is about a mermaid who wishes to undergo an 
operation to remove her fishlike tail and get legs and a vagina in order to be more appealing to 
men.  
Then there are also the multiple re-interpretations of the Frankenstein myth which bring 
the Monster’s gender identity and gender confusion into sharp focus. One example being 
Frankenstein Created Woman (Terence Fisher, 1967), wherein Dr. Frankenstein places the 
“soul” of a dead man into the body of a dead woman and brings this male/female creature to life. 
Or take Frankenhooker (Frank Henenlotter, 1990) for instance, in which the Doctor’s girlfriend 
dies and he reconstructs her using pieces of dead prostitutes… and concludes with a twist ending 
wherein the resurrected Monster must reconstruct the Doctor’s body, but also does so using 
female prostitutes’ body parts.  
The extreme prevalence of these widely variant kinds of trans representation in horror 
cinema calls for much greater analysis than I am able to provide in the scope of this paper. Yet 
their existence is to be expected considering horror cinema’s relation to transness. The claim at 
the outset of Benshoff’s Monsters in the Closet says it all: “In short, for many people in our 
shared English-language culture, homosexuality is a monstrous condition. Like an evil Mr. Hyde, 
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or the Wolfman, a gay or lesbian self inside of you might be striving to get out.”41 This claim is 
equally true for trans people. Indeed, the very fact that transness is often defined by an 
identification with the ontological “other” and even a fear of one’s own body makes the trans 
experience one that is even more akin to that of Mr. Hyde (in fact, there is even a film that 
directly plays with this idea, Dr. Jekyll & Sister Hyde (Roy Ward Baker, 1971). That horror 
cinema fosters drag spectatorship and cross/trans-gender spectatorship is only further proof of 
the need for a greater trans studies analysis of horror cinema. Above all else though, it is the 
figure of the monster that stands as the representative of horror’s inherently trans nature. The 
monster is the liminal being that violates our most sacred binaries, human/non-human, 
living/dead, and, of course, male/female.  
  
 
41 Benshoff, Monsters in the Closet, 1. 
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Films: 
Beyond the Valley of the Dolls 
Boys Beware 
Bride of Frankenstein 
Cat People 
Cherry Falls 
Deranged 
Dr. Jekyll & Sister Hyde 
Dracula’s Daughter 
Dressed to Kill 
Frankenhooker 
Frankenstein 
Frankenstein Created Woman 
Ginger Snaps 
Homicidal 
King Kong 
Lure, The 
Pink Flamingos 
Psycho 
Rock Horror Picture Show, The 
Silence of the Lambs, The 
Sleepaway Camp 
Star Wars 
Stripped to Kill 
Texas Chain Saw Massacre, The 
Three on a Meathook 
Ticked-Off Trannies with Knives 
Vanishing Lady, The 
Wasp Woman, The  
Russ Meyer, 1970 
Sid Davis, 1961 
James Whale, 1935 
Jacques Tourneur, 1942 
Geoffrey Wright, 2000 
Jeff Gillen, Alan Ormsby, 1970 
Roy Ward Baker, 1971 
Lambert Hillyer, 1936 
Brian De Palma, 1980 
Frank Henenlotter, 1990 
James Whale, 1931 
Terence Fisher, 1967 
John Fawcett, 2000 
William Castle, 1961 
Merian C. Cooper, Ernest B. Schoedsack, 1933 
Agnieszka Smoczynska, 2015 
John Waters, 1972 
Alfred Hitchcock, 1960 
Jim Sharman, 1975 
Jonathan Demme, 1991 
Robert Hiltzik, 1983 
George Lucas, 1977 
Katt Shea, 1987 
Tobe Hooper, 1974 
William Girdler, 1972 
Israel Luna, 2010 
Georges Méliès, 1896 
Roger Corman, 1959 
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